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Content and Its Vehicles in Connectionist Systems 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper advocates explicitness about the type of entity to be considered as content-
bearing in connectionist systems; it makes a positive proposal about how vehicles of 
content should be individuated; and it deploys that proposal to argue in favour of 
representation in connectionist systems.  The proposal is that the vehicles of content in 
some connectionist systems are clusters in the state space of a hidden layer.  Attributing 
content to such vehicles is required to vindicate the standard explanation for some 
classificatory networks’ ability to generalise to novel samples their correct classification of 
the samples on which they were trained. 
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An unnoticed misconception has had a pernicious effect in debates about connectionism.  A 
tacit assumption has been at work about the entities to which content should be ascribed in 
connectionist systems.  Lack of clarity about what they are taking the content-bearing 
entities to be is found on both sides of the ongoing debate about whether connectionist 
systems process internal representations.  That battle, engaged most prominently between 
Jerry Fodor and Paul Churchland, can only be adjudicated relative to a specification of the 
vehicles to which putative contents are to be ascribed.  Moreover, the assumption 
standardly made by connectionists, usually tacitly, about the individuation of vehicles of 
content serves to undermine their case for connectionist representation. 
 This paper advocates explicitness about the type of entity to be considered as 
content-bearing in connectionist systems; it makes a positive proposal about how vehicles 
of content should be individuated; and it deploys that proposal to argue in favour of 
representation in connectionist systems.  To preview, the vehicles are clusters in the state 
space of a hidden layer; and attributing content to such vehicles is required for one kind of 
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explanation of the behaviour of some networks. 
 The paper is in seven sections.  Section (1) brings to light some standard assumptions 
about the vehicles of content in connectionist systems and suggests how they can be 
relaxed.  Section (2) proposes that clusters are the vehicles of content, and section (3) 
deploys clusters in a content-based explanation of how some networks manage to 
generalise their trained correct performance to new samples.  Section (4) interprets Laakso 
& Cottrell’s exciting empirical results about similarities between connectionist networks in 
the light of this proposal.  Section (5) examines whether Fodor & Lepore’s criticisms of 
state space semantics apply to the new approach.  Section (6) mentions some further 
virtues of treating the vehicles of content in connectionist systems in this way, and section 
(7) lists some possible refinements. 
 
1. Standard Assumptions About Connectionist Representations 
This paper is part of a larger project, which is to assess whether connectionist systems 
process internal representations. Can and should their operation be explained by 
attributing representational content to their internal states?  My contribution is to 
formulate a clear proposal about the vehicles of content.1  For the sake of clarity, the 
current paper considers only multi-layer feedforward classifier networks trained by 
supervised learning using a delta rule.2  Section 7 below suggests how the proposal can be 
generalised. 
 The cognitive revolution rehabilitated internal representations.  However, with the 
package came rejection of behaviourism’s associative learning mechanisms and a 
requirement that representations combine compositionally.  Connectionists who seek to 
explain their systems representationally need only subscribe to the first article of the 
canon.  They aim to posit internal representations, but ones which are acquired by 
                                                 
1  I remain neutral about whether such contents qualify as ‘meanings’ in any sense. 
2  Usher (2001) which uses probabilistic classification networks to analyse content, but in a different way: to 
get at the statistical relations which are relied on in the informational theory of content offered there.  The 
treatment does not concern the contents found within hidden layers of classificatory networks. 
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associationist learning and which need not have compositional structure.  Connectionists 
can still join the cognitivists in going beyond instrumentalism about representation − if they 
can show that their systems too process real internal vehicles of content.3  Thus, 
representationalism requires, at a minimum, that a contentful explanation of the behaviour 
of a connectionist network be underpinned by a mechanism in the system which operates 
over representational vehicles to which those contents are ascribed. 
Some may object to calling this ‘representation’, since it is sometimes required of 
representations that they enter into compositional structures, but the terminology is 
deliberate, since to assume that representations must be compositional is to beg an 
important question against the connectionist.  The entities that vindicate the cognitive 
revolution’s first and defining commitment − to an internal mechanism involving vehicles of 
content which are individuable non-semantically − deserve to be called representations.  
Typing representations as vehicles of content groups together different internal entities 
into classes that are importantly alike for internal processing, such they are all to be 
ascribed the same content: they are different realisations of the same vehicle of content.4 
In a network that employs parallel distributed processing, each representation will be 
some pattern of activation distributed across a layer of the network.  It is tempting to move 
from this truism to the tacit assumption that each pattern of distributed activation is a 
different representation, and thus that each can have a (slightly) different content.  
                                                 
3  There may be some organisms and systems that are only representers in the instrumental sense − they are 
interpretable from the intentional stance (Dennett 1987), though not in virtue of processing real internal 
representations.  The issue here is whether a commitment to real internal representations, with its added 
explanatory purchase, can be defended for some connectionist systems. 
4  As I use the terms here, representations are concrete particulars (with contents, in addition to non-semantic 
properties); and vehicles of content are also representations, but individuated in a particular way: according 
to the non-semantic properties which group different tokens together as being of the same representation 
type for the purpose of assigning content to them.  The usage is the same with written language: the word 
‘John’ is the vehicle of the content John, but the word is a type − a (non-semantic) typing of marks on the 
page, of which the following are tokens: John, John, JOHN.  If a representation is picked out semantically 
(eg, my current singular thought about my brother), then this also picks out a concrete particular − a 
representation − but not as a vehicle of content. 
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However, that is to deny that a network’s states can be grouped together into vehicles of 
content at all.  We should not foreclose the possibility of specifying vehicle types that 
abstract away from details of their realisation.  After all, vehicle types in a classical 
computer are multiply realised in the implementing mechanism, rather in the way that the 
ink marks ‘dog’, ‘Dog’ and ‘DOG’ are different physical realisations of the same word type.  
In searching for a non-semantic representation typing for connectionist systems, we should 
be open to the possibility that different patterns of distributed activation are of the same 
vehicle type. 
The same point can be put in the language of state space.  A state space is a useful 
way to think about patterns of activation across a layer of a network.  State space is a 
notional high-dimensional space whose axes are constituted by the activation of nodes of 
the layer, so that any pattern of distributed activation corresponds to a point in the space.  
The standard assumption is that each point in state space is a different representational 
vehicle with a slightly different content.  That is a mistake.  A successful representational 
account of connectionist systems is likely to group the points of state space into vehicle 
types, such that different points are of the same vehicle type.  At least, in searching for a 
non-semantic representation typing we should allow for that possibility.  We should reject 
the standard tacit commitment, which implicitly excludes it, that vehicle types are 
maximally fine-grained, each point in state space being a different representational vehicle 
with the potential to have a unique content. 
A second standard assumption is to take each individual node in a layer as 
representing something separately, so that the nodes which are active in a given 
distributed pattern of activation make individual (proportional) contributions to the 
content of the distributed representation.  For example: 
 
‘Mental representations are taken to consist of “subsymbols” associated with each 
node, while “whole” representations are real-valued vectors in a high-dimensional 
property space.’  (Eliasmith 2003, p. 2, italics added.) 
 
‘The activation of a given unit (in a given context) thus signals a semantic fact: but it 
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may be a fact that defies easy description using the words and phrases of daily 
language.’  (Clark 2001, p. 67, italics added.) 
 
The nodes are thought to represent complex, inexpressible ‘microfeatures’ of the 
presented stimuli.  For example, Cottrell thinks that each node in one of his trained face 
recognition networks represents a ‘holon’: some complex property of human faces, which 
can often be visualised as a ghostly, face-like shadow.5  This idea is both supported by, and 
lends support to, the foregoing assumption of maximally fine-grained vehicle individuation.  
The two assumptions together underwrite what I will call the microfeatural approach.  The 
microfeatural approach encourages the view that, if connectionist systems represent, they 
do so in a way which is highly complex, with contents quite unlike those in everyday 
explanations.  Their contents may even be ineffable.  From here it is only a short step, via 
viewing connectionist networks as some kind of model of human brains, to eliminativism 
about the contents ascribed in everyday psychological explanations,6 which some are happy 
to embrace.7 
 Yet there is no reason why the semantically relevant dimensions of a hidden layer 
state space should correspond to the activations of single nodes.  The semantic dimensions 
may be independent of the axes defined by individual nodes.  Thus, relaxing this second 
standard assumption opens up the possibility that hidden layers with different numbers of 
nodes could have the same number of semantic dimensions. 
 Finally, the microfeatural approach encourages the idea that hidden layer nodes 
represent even before training.  After all, even when the network is assigned random or 
arbitrary weights, each node is differentially responsive to some complex, unspecifiable 
property of possible stimuli.  However, the most exciting quality of connectionist models is 
their ability to develop entirely new representational resources.  At best, they may give us 
an insight into how neural systems can develop from an untrained state which does not 
                                                 
5  Cottrell & Metcalfe (1991). 
6  Ramsey, Stich & Garon (1990). 
7  P.M. Churchland (1981); P. S. Churchland & T. J. Sejnowski (1989). 
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represent to a trained one which does.  The microfeatural approach is apt to stifle that 
hope from the outset.  We should reject it, and allow that it may be that vehicles of 
content only arise at all as a result of development, so that an untrained network may be 
incapable of representation. 
 
TABLE 1. Standard assumptions about vehicles of content in connectionist systems, 
and alternatives 
(1) Each point in hidden layer state space has a 
(slightly) different content 
(1’) Different points in state space may fall 
into the same representational vehicle, 
and thereby have the same content 
(2) Hidden units are the basic semantic dimen-
sions of hidden layer state space (each 
representing some complex ‘microfeature’) 
(2’) Semantic dimensions in hidden layer 
state space may be independent of the 
axes defined by hidden layer nodes 
(3) Points in hidden layer state space are 
content-bearing before training 
(3’) Points in hidden layer state space may 
not be content-bearing except as a 
result of development 
 
 
2. Clusters as Vehicles of Content 
When a network is trained, the final values of connection weights between its nodes are 
exquisitely sensitive to the starting weights (which are often assigned randomly) and the 
order of presentation of training samples.  It seems dizzyingly difficult to compare the 
different weight matrices which result.  And there is no obvious way of comparing trained 
networks with different architectures, since their weight matrices have different 
dimensions.  The microfeatural approach entrenches the view that these different matrices 
encode different solutions to the training task, which may be practically incommensurable.  
When that approach is rejected, the possibility arises that the mechanism of operation of a 
network can be described in a way which abstracts away from individual weight matrices 
and particular patterns of activation, such that it is shared by different networks trained on 
the same task.  Such a description of a network’s mechanism of operation would treat 
different patterns of activation as realisations of the same inner state, and so would be a 
good candidate for typing of vehicles of content. 
 It is striking that trained networks often manage to generalise: they can project their 
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correct performance to samples not encountered during training.  How so?  An optimistic 
hope is that there is a representational explanation of this ability.  This gives us a wish-list 
to guide our search for vehicles of content: 
 
Desiderata − typing the vehicles of content in a connectionist system should:- 
(i) capture some underlying property of the network’s mechanism of operation by 
which it performs its task; 
(ii) abstract away from individual weight matrices and particular patterns of 
activation; 
(iii) be such that it may be shared by different networks trained on the same task; 
and 
(iv) form part of an explanation of the network’s ability to project its correct 
performance to new samples outside the training set. 
 
 Fodor claims that there is no way of describing a connectionist network that separates 
points in state space into different types: 
 
‘The “smallest” unit of connectionist representation for which a type/token relation 
is definable is a whole network.’  (Fodor 2000, p. 50) 
 
The present paper takes Fodor’s objection as a challenge − it aims to show that there is 
such a typing (and that it meets the foregoing desiderata for vehicles of content). 
Fortunately, modelling work already has a resource which can be modified and 
redeployed to meet the desiderata − cluster analysis.  Cluster analysis is a family of 
techniques for mapping the distribution of activation points in state space.  In one version a 
dendogram is constructed which pairs each activation point with its nearest neighbour, 
then pairs these pairs with nearest pairs, and so on, producing a hierarchical tree.  
Dendograms show that in trained networks similar samples often produce similar patterns 
of activation in the hidden layer.  An example is Sejnowski & Rosenberg’s (1987) NETtalk 
network, which was trained to map English text to phonetic representations of its 
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pronunciation.  NETtalk’s hidden layer makes a broad distinction between vowels and 
consonants, on the way to producing its fine-grained output classification into English 
phonemes (represented as distributions of articulatory features).8 
 Training tends to cause activation vectors to cluster together in hidden layer state 
space.9  This is because the training task is to produce clusters in the state space of the 
output layer (correct responses to training samples fall into clusters, often degenerate 
clusters located on the axes constituting the space).  The network must take points which 
are distributed throughout input layer state space and transform them into appropriate 
clusters in output layer state space.  Forming a relevant intermediate clustering in hidden 
layer state space is a step towards achieving that goal.  Indeed, modellers deploy various 
techniques to encourage hidden layer clustering.10  The tools of cluster analysis can be 
understood as probing a network’s representational structure − the modellers just don’t 
realise that they are uncovering their systems’ vehicles of content. 
Making scatter plots of the receptivity of individual hidden layer nodes can also be 
understood as looking for clusters.  Tight scatters are found if clusters happen to fall near 
an axis of the state space.  Where two or more nodes are found to be receptive to the same 
set of samples (e.g. Dawson & Piercey 2001) it is especially clear that this reflects a single 
underlying cluster.  Other techniques merely suggest that there is hidden layer clustering 
without individuating the clusters.  For example, clusters cannot reliably be read off 
dendograms.  To individuate clusters, the first step is to plot the distribution of points in 
                                                 
8  Of course, this is not a miracle.  There must be information in the input-output mapping on which the 
network was trained that allows it to make the vowel-consonant distinction.  In the version of NETtalk which 
codes outputs as phonological features, this information may be found in part in the fact that vowels are 
more alike one another in phonological features than are consonants.  However, similar results are achieved 
when NETtalk’s outputs are coded orthogonally, in which case the information needed to make the vowel-
consonant discrimination must have been derived during training entirely from the inputs. 
9  E.g. in Pollack’s (1990) recursive auto-associative memory networks and Elman’s (1990) simple recurrent 
networks, both described in Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2002), pp. 171-187. 
10  E.g. ‘skeletonization’ in Mozer & Smolensky (1989); training in graded batches in Elman (1991); and extra-
output learning in Dawson et al (2000). 
 10
the hidden layer state space of the trained network (each point corresponds to the 
activation produced by one of the samples to which the network has been trained to 
respond correctly).  Regions of state space are then identified containing clusters of 
proximal points which are relatively distant from the other points in state space (relative to 
the overall volume filled by activation points produced by all training samples).  There are 
various methods of determining how many clusters there are and where they lie.  There are 
also important outstanding empirical issues about how best to individuate clusters in 
particular cases and whether to understand their boundaries as sharp or fuzzy.  However, 
the important point is that a measure of proximity that is relative to the dimensions of a 
particular state space is sufficient to allow points to be grouped together based on such 
proximity. 
FIGURE 1. Clusters in a state space with two hidden layer nodes 
 
 
 My claim is that these clusters or regions in state space are vehicles of content.  The 
system’s internal mechanism can be described in terms of operations on these vehicles 
thus: a presented sample activates a hidden layer cluster, which in turn activates an output 
layer cluster.  We will see in the next section how and why contents should be ascribed to 
such clusters. 
Notice that different networks can have type-identical clusters − a cluster in the state 
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space of network A might be activated by the very same samples11 as those which activate 
a particular cluster in network B.  Indeed, clustering properties are independent of the 
number of hidden layer nodes,12 so that state spaces with different numbers of axes may 
contain the same clusters.  Thus, clustering properties can be shared by networks with 
different weight matrices and architectures.  Networks might share some but not all 
clustering properties − a cluster in network A might correspond to another in network B 
activated by just the same samples without there being a correspondence between the 
other clusters in the two networks.  So sharing some clusters does not guarantee that the 
networks will have the same overall set of vehicles of content. 
Are clusters causally efficacious?  The worry is that the activation of a cluster is 
always realised by the activation of a particular pattern of distributed activation.  A 
complete description of the operation of a network can be given at this lower level, in 
terms of connection weights and individual patterns of activation.  This worry is, in fact, 
just a particular guise of the standard problem of the causal efficacy of the properties 
found in the special sciences.  It arises for vehicles of content in a classical computer, too, 
since classical syntax is also realised by lower-level processes.  The syntax of a high level 
programming language is realised by the syntax of lower-level languages, sometimes 
proceeding via a series of levels until primitive computations are arrived at which can be 
implemented in physical components like transistors (whose operation is explained by 
molecular properties of the semiconducting crystals which realise those components).  
Indeed, it should arise for any adequate typing of vehicles of content in any computational 
system, since the vehicle types should generalise over some class of lower level causal / 
mechanistic entities.  It is an important metaphysical question whether any such special 
science property is causal − perhaps overdetermination can be dealt with and causation 
                                                 
11  Throughout I use ‘samples’ for the real world entities, like colour chips, that are coded into inputs on which 
the networks are trained.  Thus, the same sample will be encoded into different input vectors for the 
training of different networks.  Points in a cluster are compared via samples, not input vectors. 
12  Subject to the constraint that the number of independent dimensions in cluster space obviously cannot 
exceed the number of nodes in a layer. 
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exists at multiple levels, perhaps they merely cause in virtue of being realised, etc. − but 
the causal efficacy of connectionist clusters is not a special case.  For present purposes it is 
enough that clusters are just as explanatory, or as causal-explanatory, as the properties of 
chemistry, electronics or biology; indeed, they have the same metaphysical status as 
vehicles of content in classical computers.  Most notably, these metaphysical questions 
arise for mental properties in general, when considered naturalistically.  It might even be 
thought a merit of my proposed vehicles of content that, on this issue at least, they have 
the same metaphysical status as mental properties. 
Where modellers have only tacitly subscribed to the microfeatural approach, it is easy 
to reconceive their explanations in terms of clusters.  By contrast, Andy Clark has been 
much more careful, and he explicitly endorses the microfeatural approach to understanding 
static networks (1993, 1996; and 2001 quoted above).  Even so, when it comes to dynamic 
connectionist networks, Clark abandons the microfeatural idea, which is hard to make any 
sense of in the dynamic context.  Instead, he allows that dynamic analysis of a network − 
finding attractor basins or principal component processes that account for its behaviour 
over time − might be uncovering temporally extended physical processes that are the 
vehicles of representational content in such systems (Clark 2001, p. 135).  The complexity 
of the dynamic case pushes Clark away from seeing such systems in terms of microfeatures.  
I would argue that the basic unworkability of the microfeatural idea is just as good a reason 
for abandoning it for static networks.  If basins of attraction for dynamic processes are the 
vehicles of content in dynamic networks, that strongly suggests that their analogue, 
clusters, are the vehicles of content in static networks. 
 
3. Contentful Explanation 
So we have seen that a trained network’s mechanism of operation can often be described in 
terms of clusters.  Are these vehicles of content?  The acid test is whether content should 
be ascribed to the clusters.  I will argue that it should if clusters are to be invoked, as is 
common empirical practice, in an explanation of a network’s ability to generalise its 
correct performance to new samples; thus that clusters are vehicles of content to the 
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extent that they form the basis of generalisation. 
It is one of the remarkable features of connectionist networks that they can often 
correctly classify new samples which differ in their input encoding from anything 
encountered during training.  Modellers standardly point to clustering to explain this 
phenomenon.  It is observed that the activation produced by correctly classified novel 
samples often falls into existing clusters in a hidden layer,13 and the ability to project 
correct behaviour to new samples is explained by the proximity to existing points in hidden 
layer state space of the activation produced by the new samples.14  Conversely, where the 
hidden layer state space fails to differentiate into clusters, that fact is offered to explain 
why the network failed to project its correct responses to new samples.15 
Describing the mechanism in terms of clusters can show why the network behaves as 
it does with new inputs.  Considered as individual patterns of activation, the new inputs are 
not the same as anything that the network has encountered during training (worse, a new 
sample will generally not be linearly separable, in input layer state space, from points 
representing training samples mapped to entirely different output classifications).  But 
from the point of view of clusters, the new samples produce activation in the same hidden 
layer clusters as samples in the training set.  When the network is described as 
transforming samples into hidden layer clusters and onwards into output layer clusters, 
then it is apparent that the new samples are being treated in the same way as some of the 
samples in the training set. 
 Thus, characterising the operation of the network in terms of clusters allows us to see 
it as carrying out the same operations on new samples as it did on samples in the training 
set, leading to correct classification of those new samples.  This is unlikely to be a matter 
of chance, so we are driven to look for an explanation: something in virtue of which the 
same operations continue to produce correct results in response to new samples.  That is to 
say, the empirically-observed phenomenon I am relying on cries out for the following kind 
                                                 
13  Lehky and Sejnowski (1987) & (1988), Hinton (1989), Elman (1991), Dawson & Piercey (2001). 
14  Churchland & Sejnowski (1992), p. 169. 
15  Clark (1993), pp. 132-135, Elman (1991). 
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of explanation: the new samples have some property in virtue of which they fall into 
existing hidden layer clusters, and so cause the network to produce correct responses at 
the output layer. 
That kind of explanation cannot just advert to patterns of activation at the input 
layer, since new samples differ in their input encodings from anything in the training set.  
So it is obliged to advert to properties of the samples themselves.  The explanation is that 
the network is able to keep track of some property that is common between a new sample 
and some of the samples in training set, and that is relevant to the output classification.  It 
does so by means of hidden layer clusters. That is to say, by activating an existing hidden 
layer cluster the network represents that the new sample has the property common to the 
training samples in the cluster.  This correct intermediate classification is part of the 
process by which the network makes a correct output classification.  Conversely, if a new 
sample fails to activate an existing hidden layer cluster, or if it activates a cluster of 
training samples with which it does not share a relevant property, the network will usually 
fail to make the correct output classification.  In that case, misrepresentation at the 
hidden layer helps account for misrepresentation at the output layer.16  So, are modellers 
right to point to hidden layer clusters to explain how a network manages correctly to 
classify a novel sample?  Yes, provided their explanation is understood as attributing 
content to those clusters. 
In short, the ability to project to new samples is explained by the fact that hidden 
layer clusters represent properties of the samples which are relevant to the output 
classification.  A more limited explanation is also available: the network correctly classifies 
samples (new and old) in the relevant domain (e.g. colour samples) by output properties 
O1, …, On (e.g. red, blue and green) because that is what it was trained to do.  It is a 
historical explanation in terms of facts about the network’s development.  The explanation 
we have been considering goes further, and gives an ahistorical account of how, after 
learning is completed, the network correctly classifies a new sample.  It relies, not on facts 
                                                 
16  Of course, correct classification at the hidden layer does not necessitate correct performance at the output 
layer, it just makes it much more likely; so the explanation offered here is abductive and defeasible. 
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about the network’s developmental history, but on facts about its internal structure and 
the dispositions of those structures in relation to features of the network’s environment.  
The explanation points to an intermediate processing stage which is sensitive to a relevant 
external property but which is, at the same time, part of the internal mechanism by which 
the system arrives at its output classification. 
The argument for viewing clusters as vehicles of content is based on giving an 
explanation for generalisation.  Some networks fail to generalise, for example by having too 
many nodes in their hidden layer and so treating each input ‘near-individually’.  In such 
cases, even if there happen to be clusters in the network’s hidden layer state space 
(perhaps duplicating clusters in input layer state space), they will not be bearers of 
content. 
The properties tracked by hidden layer clusters can relate in various ways to the 
properties the network is trained to represent at the output layer.  They may be more 
general than, the same as, more specific than, or orthogonal to the output properties.  We 
saw above that NETtalk divides samples into vowels and consonants on the way to making 
phonetic classifications at the output layer.  Hinton’s (1989) network trained to keep track 
of family relationships between individuals was sensitive, in its internal structure, to 
features like age and nationality which were not given as training primitives.  Elman’s 
(1990) simple recurrent networks for predicting the next word in a linguistic corpus are 
trained merely with series of binary encodings of words.  Cluster analysis of a trained 
network showed that the hidden layer had organised the words into grammatical and 
semantic categories: nouns vs. verbs, within nouns into animate vs. inanimate nouns, and 
within animate nouns into words for humans vs. animals.  A final example is Pollack’s 
(1990) recursive auto-associative network trained on sets of syntactic phrase structure 
trees.  After training, verb phrases formed one cluster in the hidden layer state space, and 
prepositional phrases another − a level of generality not given explicitly in the training 
data. 
The proposal is not to endow networks with original intentionality.  Hidden layer 
clusters are only contentful in virtue of the contents ascribed to outputs.  The modeller 
takes the outputs to represent some properties O1, …, On and trains the network to be good 
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at classifying by these properties.  Causal, informational and teleological theories of 
content would all ascribe content to the outputs on this basis, and even non-naturalistic 
approaches can allow that outputs have contents which derive from the intentions of the 
modeller (in the same way that words in a public language derive content from the 
intentions of speakers and hearers).  The content of hidden layer clusters stems from their 
relevance as an intermediate stage in making this contentful output classification.  In fact, 
even the individuation of vehicles of content (section (2) above) assumes that the system’s 
response to samples can be judged as correct or incorrect: recall that hidden layer clusters 
are to be individuated by considering only samples correctly classified as a result of training 
(and plotting the activation they produce in hidden layer state space).  Although hidden 
layer content is merely derivative, it is an important step towards representationalism 
about connectionist systems if we are able to understand the operation of hidden layers in 
contentful terms, given contents at the output layer. 
So, we have the following sufficient condition for ascribing content to internal states 
of a connectionist system. 
 
Jointly sufficient conditions for attributing content to patterns of activation of a 
hidden layer of a connectionist network:- 
(a) the network is able correctly to classify some set of samples which differ (i.e., 
differ in their input encoding) from those in the training set (‘new samples’); 
(b) the new samples fall into hidden layer clusters formed by samples in the 
training set; 
(c) each new sample shares a property with the training samples in its cluster; and 
(d) that property is relevant to the classificatory task. 
 
The extent to which connectionist networks satisfy these conditions remains an empirical 
question.  We saw above that there are good reasons to think that at least some do.  
Clearly, it is an idealization.  In practice some points may fall outside any cluster, and some 
points in a cluster may not share a relevant property with the majority of their neighbours.  
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That is to be expected.  When real systems approximate to the idealized model, the model 
can be used to explain the behaviour of the real system. 
 Since samples activating the same cluster are treated by the hidden layer as similar, a 
network should be seen as treating samples as different when they activate different 
clusters in a given layer.  Thus, the content ascribed to a cluster should be distinctive of 
samples in that cluster, as compared with other clusters in the same layer.  So the content 
to be ascribed to make good the foregoing explanation of correct classification of new 
samples is as follows: 
 
Content of a cluster 
Activation of a cluster represents that the presented sample has the property, 
causally or constitutively relevant to whether the input samples have the properties 
represented by the output layer, that is common to and distinctive of the correctly 
classified training samples which produce activation within that cluster. 
 
This is not intended to be constitutive of content.  Rather, it describes the contents 
that should be ascribed, but does not attempt to capture the factors in virtue of which 
clusters have those contents.  Thus, it furnishes a useful constraint on any metaphysical 
theory of content − that, when applied to connectionist systems, the theory should deliver 
these contents. 
 Although I have expressed the content of a cluster in the form the presented sample 
has property P, the cluster has no constituent structure.  These are non-conceptual 
contents (according to one common understanding of that term).  English forces us to use a 
phrase with subject-predicate structure to describe a complete propositional content 
which, for the system, is realised by a single state without such structure.  The system is 
doing something simple, like feature placing.  It can represent properties of the currently-
present sample but cannot represent properties of objects presented in any other way.  For 
these simple systems, the connectionist network should not be thought of as representing 
propositional constituents, and its representations do not enter into compositional 
structures. 
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 Since the properties tracked by a hidden layer must be causally or constitutively 
relevant to the output task, they must be natural properties.  This is a notoriously difficult 
distinction to draw, but it is motivated by many considerations, and the distinction is 
needed in many fields; it is not peculiar to connectionist content.  Roughly, the idea is that 
natural properties must figure in natural laws − in this case laws (causal or constitutive) 
that relate the properties represented at the output layer with those kept track of by the 
hidden layer.  In particular, arbitrary disjunctions of properties will not do. 
Will ascription of content to hidden layer clusters encourage eliminativism, as with 
the microfeatural approach (when connectionist systems are taken to model aspects of 
human psychology)?  The four examples of hidden layer clustering mentioned above tracked 
properties which are familiar in folk psychology (vowel vs. consonant, nouns vs. verbs, 
etc.).  Further empirical investigation is needed to be sure that this is true in general, but 
there is no obvious pressure towards complex or inexpressible contents.  It seems likely 
that, when networks are trained to represent familiar properties at their outputs, the 
properties tracked by hidden layer clusters as a means to making such output classifications 
will usually be familiar as well.  Contrast the microfeatural approach, where fine-grained 
vehicle typing leads to extremely complex contents, and where taking individual hidden 
layer nodes as the representational primitives involves attributing to them extremely 
unfamiliar contents.  Those pressures towards eliminativism are mistaken according to the 
current proposal.  The microfeatural approach gets the wrong contents because it 
individuates vehicles of content in the wrong way. 
 In sum, there is a good reason to attribute content to hidden layer clusters.  They also 
satisfy our desiderata for individuation of vehicles of content (see §2 above):  They describe 
a network’s mechanism of operation in a way which abstracts away from individual weight 
matrices and particular patterns of activation such that the same operations may be found 
in different networks trained on the same task.  Clusters also fulfil the optimistic ambition 
that representations might help to explain networks’ mysterious ability to project correct 
classificatory practice to novel samples.  Taken together, this amounts to a compelling case 
that clusters are vehicles of content in connectionist systems. 
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4. Laakso & Cottrell’s Results 
The microfeatural approach takes it that individual hidden layer nodes are the basic 
vehicles of content.  Distributed patterns of activation are composed of these 
representational primitives, and inherit their content from them.  I have been arguing for a 
way of individuating vehicles according to which only the distribution of points in hidden 
layer state space is relevant, irrespective of their disposition in relation to the axes defined 
by hidden layer nodes.  Important empirical work by Laakso & Cottrell (2000) makes it 
strikingly clear that this is the right strategy. 
 Laakso & Cottrell trained a series of networks with different architectures to do 
colour classification.  All were static three-layer feedforward networks learning by a delta 
rule with backpropagation of error.  They differed in the way colour samples were coded as 
inputs (ranging between 3 and 96 input nodes) and in the number of nodes in the hidden 
layer (1 to 10).  Laakso & Cottrell aimed to compare the arrangement of activation points 
in the respective state spaces of the different networks.  Remarkably, when trained to 
classify the same samples according to the same output classification, networks with 
different architectures arrived at very similar arrangements of activation points in hidden 
layer state space, provided they had three of more units in the hidden layer. 
 To show this, Laakso & Cottrell first constructed dendograms which indicate that their 
trained networks do show clustering.  Then they compared pairs of networks to see 
whether they clustered the samples in the same way.  Specifically, they tested whether 
samples that produced proximal activation in the hidden layer state space of one network 
also produced proximal activation in the other and, conversely, whether distal samples in 
one network were also distal in the other.  They did so by calculating the distances 
between pairs of points within each state space.  These distances can be thought of as a 
series of ordered pairs: 
 
<distance between activation produced by sample m and sample n in network A, 
   distance between activation produced by sample m and sample n in network B> 
 
 20
To test how similar the state space of network A is to the state space of network B, Laakso 
& Cottrell measured the statistical correlation between the elements in these ordered 
pairs.  This measures whether distances in network A which are small relative to the other 
distances in the hidden layer state space of network A correspond to distances in network B 
which are small relative to the others in network B, etc.  The test is independent of the 
absolute size of either state space.  In work reported by Churchland (1998), Laakso & 
Cottrell also compared the rank-orders of distances in the two networks, with the same 
results − networks trained on the same problem tended to have similar arrangements of 
activation points in hidden layer state space. 
 
FIGURE 2.  Comparing the arrangement of points in two state spaces 
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 The beauty of these kind of tests is that they are applicable between networks with 
different architectures.  Laakso & Cottrell found that even networks with different numbers 
of input nodes, or different numbers of hidden nodes, arranged activation points similarly 
in state space.  This vindicates the intuition that networks with quite different weight 
matrices and even different architectures might, as a result of training on the same 
samples, solve a problem in the same way.  It also shows that the kind of inter-network 
similarity in clustering properties suggested in my discussion of connectionist 
representation is found in real systems, and so lends further empirical support to the claim 
that clusters are vehicles of content. 
 Churchland (1998) welcomed Laakso & Cottrell’s results (reporting them before their 
publication in 2000).  He embraced the idea that state spaces constituted by different 
numbers of hidden nodes might nevertheless have points arranged in the same way, and 
thus that the semantically-relevant dimensions in state space are independent of the axes 
defined by individual nodes.  In the process he gave up his earlier claim that individual 
hidden layer nodes represent complex microfeatures of stimuli presented to the network.  
However, he took the Laakso & Cottrell test to be a direct measure of content similarity.  
In my view, the test is too strong as a measure of content similarity.  Networks which show 
clustering and whose inter-point distances are highly correlated will indeed have the same 
contents ascribed to all their corresponding clusters.  But recall that on my approach it is 
possible for some clusters to share contents while others do not.  Taking Laakso & Cottrell’s 
correlation test as a direct measure of content similarity, as Churchland does, rules out this 
possibility.  Churchland takes each individual point to be a different vehicle of content and 
is left with the whole state space as the only unit of comparison.  Section (3) above shows 
why content should be ascribed to individual clusters.  As a result, the contents of 
particular clusters can be compared.  Then it can be that, for some clusters in network A 
there is a cluster with the same content in network B, but not for others.  Thus, it does not 
follow from there being one or more corresponding pairs of clusters which have the same 
content in both networks that the networks have the same overall set of vehicles of 
content.  Also, clusters with the same contents may be differently arranged in the state 
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spaces of two networks.17  In either case, Laakso & Cottrell’s test would show a low 
correlation even though some or all of the clusters in the two networks do indeed have the 
same contents.  In short, Laakso & Cottrell’s work establishes the important empirical 
result that, in practice, there are networks whose hidden layer clusters have the same 
contents.  But the arguments in the present paper show that a high correlation on the 
Laakso & Cottrell test is not necessary for some or all clusters to have the same content in 
the two networks under comparison. 
 
 
5. Fodor & Lepore’s Criticism of State Space Semantics 
Fodor & Lepore (1999) assemble various criticisms of Churchland (1998).  Churchland (in 
progress) has answers in relation to his account.  In this section I will examine whether 
Fodor & Lepore’s criticisms run against the version of state space semantics which I have 
advocated above.  Fodor & Lepore have two main lines of objection.  The first is to oppose 
similarity-based accounts of content and the consequences of individuating contents 
holistically.  Secondly, they argue that Laakso & Cottrell’s test could not be a measure of 
similarity in any event. 
 Fodor & Lepore rightly point out that an account of content similarity would be 
incoherent if there were no such thing as content identity.  However, Churchland need not 
concede that content identity is impossible.  In his view: 
 
‘A point in activation space acquires a specific semantic content not as a function of 
its position relative to the constituting axes of that space, but rather as a function of 
(1) its spatial position relative to all of the other contentful points within that space; 
and (2) its causal relations to stable and objective macrofeatures of the external 
environment.’ 
(Churchland 1998, p. 8, his italics) 
                                                 
17  Calvo Garzón (2003) uses this as an objection to Laakso & Cottrell’s test as a measure of content similarity, 
and rejects state space semantics as a result. 
 23
 
Churchland does not say exactly what the relevant function is, but however this framework 
is filled out networks with the same architecture and weight matrix embedded in the same 
problem will have the same contents.  The objection can only be that identity is rarely 
realised in practice, not that it is impossible in principle.  Churchland accepts this 
consequence, and therefore accepts the need for a robust notion of concept similarity. 
 Fodor & Lepore object to the idea that Churchland’s content similarity can do the 
necessary explanatory work.  To start with, from the quotation above it looks as if regress 
threatens.  The identity of a particular pattern of activation depends upon its relation to all 
other contentful points in the same state space, the identity of each of which depends 
upon their relations to all other points (including the original one), etc.  It follows that 
individual points in two state spaces cannot be compared, and that the only possible 
comparison is between the overall state spaces.  Churchland appears to agree.  His measure 
of content similarity only applies between whole state spaces.  It is a standing property.  
But we want to allow for occurrent states: when the hidden layer of a network is 
differently activated on different occasions the network represents different things.  
Networks with very similar arrangements of points (possible activations) in state space 
nevertheless may be in different occurrent states (current activation) from one another.  
Relying only on a global measure of content similarity no such distinction can be drawn. 
Thus, Churchland’s proposal threatens a destructive holism in the individuation of 
representations.18  Tiffany (1999) argues that Churchland’s theory should avoid this 
difficulty by presupposing a theory of content.  Churchland could then be read as proposing 
a way of comparing arrangements of contentful points in state space which is parasitic on a 
pre-existing assignment of content to those points.  Tiffany thinks that state space 
semantics is best seen just as a way of individuating the representational vehicles.  While I 
agree that this debate calls for clarity about the individuation of vehicles of content, I 
don’t see how a pre-existing theory of content would help, because it can only assign 
contents once the bearers of those contents have been identified. 
                                                 
18  Fodor (2000), p. 52. 
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According to my proposal, by contrast, the vehicles of content (clusters) are 
individuated without presupposing anything about their contents.  All that is needed is to 
plot the activation points in state space produced by the training samples.  This allows 
clusters to be individuated without any commitment about what is represented by 
activation in the hidden layer.  There is no threat of regress or holism in the individuation 
of vehicles of content. 
Nor does holism about content follow from my proposal.  A cluster’s relations to other 
clusters do not determine its content.  It is perfectly possible for networks to have clusters 
with the same contents arranged differently in hidden layer state space; and for two state 
spaces to be such that some contents are the same in both state spaces while others are 
completely different.  There is a constraint that different clusters in the same layer should 
be assigned different contents, but this does not depend upon the arrangement of clusters 
in state space, nor does it entail content holism.  Thus, Fodor & Lepore’s objections to 
reliance on content similarity in general (for example, in translation) are not relevant to 
my proposal.  (Furthermore, a robust measure of content similarity for individual 
activations may well be able to overcome Fodor & Lepore’s general concerns about 
similarity-based semantics.) 
Although it differs in important respects from Churchland (1998), it is worth 
emphasising that my proposal is inspired by his work and the results of Laakso & Cottrell on 
which he relies.19  Indeed, it can be seen as a version of state space semantics, filling out 
the details of the function intimated in the quotation above, but with the caveat that 
relations between points in state space (Churchland’s (1)) are relevant only to individuation 
of vehicles of content, whereas causal relations to external features ((2) above) are 
relevant to content ascription.20 
 Fodor & Lepore have a second line of objection.  They argue that state spaces with 
                                                 
19  My proposal differs in substantially the same way from O’Brien & Opie (2001), which is another working-out 
of state space semantics in the light of Laakso & Cottrell (2000). 
20  Notice that, on my proposal, the relevant external features include both properties of the input stimuli 
which cause activation of a cluster and the property represented by the output cluster which activation of 
that hidden layer cluster itself causes. 
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different numbers of nodes cannot have activations with the same content.  Thus, any 
account of content similarity (Churchland’s) or identity (mine) on which they do must be 
mistaken.  The argument is that, if semantic properties depend upon positions in state 
space, then when state spaces have different dimensionality, points in those spaces will 
have different contents.  For example, the point in 3-space which means heavy and hard 
and black (putative ROCK) along three semantic dimensions is quite different in content 
from the point in 4-space which is heavy and hard and black and animate (not a candidate 
for ROCK).  The problem with Fodor & Lepore’s objection is that it obviously assumes that 
state spaces with different numbers of hidden nodes have different numbers of semantic 
dimensions.  That does indeed follow from the old microfeatural idea that individual nodes 
are the representational primitives.  Churchland (1998) wisely abandons this idea.21 Since 
he does not state explicitly that he has changed his mind (‘I stand by those earlier 
responses …’22), it is understandable that Fodor & Lepore should predicate their objections 
on the standard microfeatural assumption found in Churchland’s earlier work.  This is 
where Laakso & Cottrell’s results have been so important in changing the terms of the 
debate.  They show that networks with different numbers of hidden layer nodes may 
nevertheless have the same semantic dimensions. 
 According to my proposal, too, semantic dimensions are independent of the axes of 
state space corresponding to individual nodes.  However, since content is assigned to a 
cluster independently, and does not depend upon its relations to other clusters, even state 
spaces with different semantic dimensions may have some clusters with the same content 
in both networks. 
 Fodor & Lepore continue.  Since they have demonstrated, they think, that Laakso & 
Cottrell’s test cannot measure semantic similarity, they consider whether it might be 
merely a test for ‘neural’ similarity (i.e., similarity in the system’s mechanism of 
operation).  Recycling the previous argument, they contend that activation patterns in 
state spaces with different numbers of hidden nodes are incommensurable − they cannot be 
                                                 
21  Tiffany (1999) also interprets Churchland (1998) this way. 
22  Churchland (1998), p. 5. 
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of the same neural type.23  They then suggest that it is a confusion, in any event, to 
suppose that individuating neural states is a way of individuating semantic states, since the 
two are found at different levels of description.  It is clear that Fodor & Lepore’s objection 
misses the mark, however, once it is established that clusters should be the vehicles of 
content under comparison.  The microfeatural approach does indeed take a fine-grained 
mechanistic level of description to be the same as the semantic level.  By contrast, clusters 
provide a way of grouping different states of the mechanism into types, so that the vehicles 
of content generalise over many states of the mechanism.  Nevertheless, pace Fodor & 
Lepore, this vehicle typing is also a mechanistic level of description, since it is a way of 
describing the system’s mechanism of operation.  An appropriately typed ‘neural’ level is 
also the semantic level.  It is not a confusion to take a neural state typing to be a typing of 
semantic states.  The semantic space just is a way of carving up neural space (when neural 
space is partitioned appropriately). 
 Fodor has a standard rejoinder to claims that the semantic level is a higher-level 
description of the operation of a connectionist network.  He says that the connectionist 
network is then just a way of implementing classical computation.24  That objection clearly 
does not count against clusters as vehicles of content.  They are indeed bearers of content, 
but in other respects they have very different properties to representations in classical 
computational systems, so that it is clear that connectionism is a quite different way of 
modelling psychology.  Clusters are processed differently from classical symbols.  They have 
no compositional structure.  They show different patterns of breakdown.  And they arise 
quite differently in development − as we shall see in the next section − which gives 
connectionism the potential to revolutionise our understanding of how the mind could be a 
computational system. 
 
 
                                                 
23  Fodor (2000), p. 51 states that they cannot; Fodor & Lepore (1999), pp. 399-400 suggests that they cannot, 
especially if the neural similarity is also the basis for content similarity. 
24  E.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988). 
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6. Further Virtues of the Proposal 
Perhaps the most striking virtue of my account of connectionist representation is the way it 
models representational development.  Theories of content standardly fail to engage with 
the mechanisms of representational development.  They just take the prior development of 
vehicles of content for granted − they assume a supply of pre-existing entities that can then 
be put into the internal and mind-world relations needed in order for them to be 
contentful.25  This assumption pushes Fodor towards his implausibly strong concept nativism 
(Fodor 1998).  By contrast, my proposal explains how a system develops new vehicles of 
content: training causes hidden layer clustering.  It offers a non-semantic (non-cognitive) 
explanation of the development of entirely new representational items.26  A connectionist 
system has no vehicles of content when it is assigned arbitrary connection weights before 
training begins.  It is only as a result of training that inputs are clustered together in the 
hidden layer.  Thus, only after training is a system representational at all, since only then 
does it have any vehicles of content.  That is a virtuous consequence. 
Compare the microfeatural idea.  According to that approach, patterns of activation 
are vehicles of content whether or not any training has taken place.  They are compounds 
of the activations of individual nodes.  And even when connection weights are set at 
arbitrarily, some complex disjunctive microfeatures can be ascribed to each individual 
                                                 
25  E.g. Laurence & Margolis (2002), p. 42 (even as they criticise Fodor’s strong concept nativism). 
26  Unlike Tiffany (1999), as discussed in the previous section.  See Rupert (2001) for an argument that the 
development of new representational primitives must be explained in non-cognitive (ie, non-semantic) 
terms.  Rupert was responding to Cummins’ general argument against representational theories of mind 
(Cummins 1997): that the development of new terms in the language of thought can never be explained 
non-semantically (since appealing to learning is always to explain development in terms of cognitive 
causes).  Rupert suggests that connectionists can answer this challenge by explaining the development of 
new representations non-cognitively and suggests that regions of state space may be the vehicles of content 
(although he talks in terms of concepts, rather than non-conceptual representations).  My proposal about 
the vehicles of content in connectionist systems vindicates that suggestion, and shows exactly how the 
connectionist can meet Cummins’ challenge by explaining the development of new vehicles of content non-
semantically. 
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node, on the basis of the samples that would cause it to be activated.  I take it to be 
almost a reductio of the microfeatural idea that it can ascribe contentful states to an 
untrained connectionist network which consists simply of some architecture of nodes 
connected by arbitrary weights.  We have no reason at all to think that the states of such a 
system are contentful.  Yet the rationale for thinking of the hidden layer nodes as each 
encoding some complex feature of all the samples by which it is causally activated applies 
equally to the untrained network. 
 The syntax of a classical computer is also built-in.  A common concern about 
modelling cognition on classical computation is that the primitive representations must all 
be present at the outset.  The system can only develop by forming new complex 
representations out of these pre-existing components.  That is a substantial limit.  By 
contrast, connectionism furnishes a model of how new primitive representations develop − 
by the system learning to ‘representationally redescribe’, in its hidden layer, the categories 
given to it as outputs, or the problem in which it is embedded (Karmiloff-Smith 1994).  
Once clusters are seen to be vehicles of content, representational redescription can be 
explained: training gives rise to new representational vehicles (clusters) in hidden layer 
state space.  The approach also shows how representation can arise out of training on a 
realistic action-based task. 
 The clustering approach to content and its vehicles in connectionist systems has many 
other virtues.  There is scope here only to list them, without further explanation.  It can 
explain the prototypicality effects exhibited by many trained networks.  It has the merit of 
assigning a role to both inputs to and outputs from a system in ascribing content.  
Furthermore, to the extent that the existence and content of clusters idealizes away from 
the messy details of real systems, it shows why processing described at the semantic level 
may only satisfy ‘soft’ constraints.27 
 
 
                                                 
27  In the terminology of Smolensky (1988), but for a different reason. 
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7. Possible Refinements 
For the sake of clarity, I have only presented the simplest version of the proposal that the 
vehicles of content in connectionist systems are clusters or regions of state space.  I should 
mention several possible refinements. 
 The proposal is naturally extended to recurrent networks, where the vehicles of 
content are basins or regions of attraction for the dynamic processes which the system 
undergoes.  In that case, the vehicles are not be confined to a particular layer, but will be 
realised by the entire network, nor are they temporally confined since they are not states 
but temporally-extended processes.  The proposal also applies to networks which develop 
with Hebbian (or any localist) learning rules and unsupervised learning algorithms.  For 
example, the processing of trained pattern association, auto-association and competitive 
networks28 can all be described in terms of clusters.  Furthermore, by attaching further 
networks to a hidden layer in which clustering has occurred, clusters could be taken as 
input for further kinds of onward processing; a simple example being to map the clusters to 
individual neurons using a competitive network. 
 The proposal can be extended to the individuation of clusters of clusters, and thus 
form the basis for an explanation of representational nesting that does not reply upon 
compositional structure or explicit knowledge representations.  It is also consistent with 
the analysis of hidden layer state space in terms of principal components.  Where some 
clusters in a layer are the result of the simple combination of others, then those principal 
components can be viewed as the primitive representational entities.29  The individuation 
of clusters can also be modified slightly to take account of the fact that in different regions 
of hidden layer state space a small change in activation may have more or less effect on 
the output activation (a modification I call processing topography analysis). 
 The proposal also gives rise to an empirical prediction (for those readers who think 
                                                 
28  Rolls & Treves (1998). 
29  Only simple linear combinations are envisaged, e.g: a, b, and a + b; with all or most of the principal 
components corresponding to clusters that are actually realised in the state space − not just any 
reparameterisation will do. 
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that entails that this can’t be philosophy: look away now).  The microfeatural idea 
motivates another standard way to investigate the internal workings of a trained network: 
knock out one of the hidden layer nodes, and from the pattern of error which results from 
the lesion, infer the representational role of that node.  Since clusters are independent of 
hidden layer nodes, no analogue of a physical lesion is available to knock out a single 
cluster.  However, something similar is accomplished by removing the effect of a single 
hidden layer cluster.  This is achieved by subtracting from the hidden layer activation 
vector the component (if any) parallel to that cluster, before activation is passed on to the 
output layer.  (That effect can be implemented across the board by a suitable 
transformation of the matrix of weights between hidden layer and output layer.)  My 
prediction is that after such a notional lesion the network will tend to mis-classify samples 
which have the property that was represented by the cluster that has been artificially 
removed. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
In the debate between philosophers about whether states of connectionist systems are 
contentful the tacit assumption that the vehicles of content are particular distributed 
patterns of activation has been left unexamined.  If the vehicles of content in connectionist 
systems are clusters in state space, then it is much easier to see that some connectionist 
networks operate by processing internal representations. 
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